In the first half of my interview with Professor Greg Restall, he laid out logical pluralism: the view that there is more than one correct logical consequence relation. In this second half, he responds to objections. Specifically, he explains why it makes sense to admit inconsistent situations even if one believes, as he does, that all possible worlds are consistent. He also touches on the relationship between notions of deductive validity and reasoning norms. We then take an extended detour into the Preface paradox, the Liar paradox, dialetheism, and the relationship between proof theory and philosophy.
In this second part of my case against 100% certainty, I tackle claims to logical certainty. These include appeals to the three fundamental laws of logic: the Law of Excluded Middle, the Law of Non-Contradiction, and the Law of Identity. To call excluded middle into doubt, I discuss non-referring terms, vagueness, fuzzy logic, and Aristotle’s problem of future contingents. For contradiction, the topics are legal contradictions, the Liar paradox, and Zeno’s Arrow. To argue against certainty of the law of identity, I cover Theseus’s ship, problems with time, problems of mereology, and the universe of symmetrical spheres. I then argue that even claims like “2+2=4” and “bachelors are bachelors” can’t be fully foolproof. Finally, a quick barrage of skeptical concerns – concerns that, while they may not be enough to justify a self-defeating view like skepticism, are enough to block claims to 100% certainty.
0:20 – Quick pt. 1 recap
1:21 – Introducing claims to logical certainty
2:21 – Classical logic, syllogistic logic, and the 3 laws
5:48 – Law of Excluded Middle
6:45 – Non-referring terms: the present king of France
9:16 – Vagueness and fuzzy logic
12:11 – Future contingents
13:51 – Law of Non-Contradiction – DeMorgan’s Law
15:38 – The legal case
18:22 – Liar paradox
22:09 – Zeno’s arrow
26:45 – Law of Identity – Theseus’s ship
29:26 – Content of an instant
31:17 – Mereological – Tibbles
36:06 – Symmetrical spheres
37:47 – Do we understand identity?
How can we tell if a paradox is really of the Liar family? Bertrand Russell proposed a structure that Graham Priest has called the “inclosure schema” – a mechanism meant to identify what drives self-referential paradoxes like the Liar and Russell’s. In this episode, I break down the technical details of the inclosure schema to show how it fits the paradoxes in question and allows us to tell apart Liar-type paradoxes from those that aren’t. I also look at some problems with the schema and how they might be solved. I conclude with an overview of a solution to the Liar: one favored by C.S. Peirce.