While debate over such a seemingly trivial question may initially sound ridiculous, the existence of “ordinary objects” is a controversial question in contemporary metaphysics. Events, numbers, properties, and “mereological sums” are among other contested “objects”. Indeed, ontology today is a bit of a quagmire of proposed objects and criteria for existence.
One of the major voices in this field is that of philosopher Amie Thomasson, who claims that ontology can actually be quite simple. In this interview, Prof. Thomasson walks us through the recent history of ontology – from Carnap to Quine to the contemporary arena – and offers a diagnosis of how things got so muddled. She then offers her alternative, which she calls “easy ontology”. According to her view, since we know that “I have two apples” is true (assuming it is), then it follows that the number of apples is two, and so that there is a number two, and therefore that at least one number exists. In this part 1, Thomasson draws out both the history of these debates and her own approach. In the second half, she’ll defend it against common objections.
0:10 – Introduction to Amie Thomasson
2:43 – What is ontology?
4:21 – Arguments against tables and chairs
8:30 – Quine and the neo-Quinean approach
22:13 – Carnap on internal versus external questions (use v.…
Do numbers “exist”? What about properties? I know my red apple exists, but does “redness” itself exist?
The existence of abstract objects seems, at first, like a deep metaphysical question. In fact, it’s a question of the pragmatics of language.
A couple of quick definitions. The view that abstract objects do exist is called “Platonism.” The view that they don’t is “nominalism.” Those who think they do exist, but only in the mind, are “conceptualists.”
Let’s take the case of numbers. A typical nominalist argument says that while you may bump into two apples somewhere along your travels, you’re never going to bump into “2.” There is no such thing independent of our descriptions of states of affairs. And that’s all abstract objects are – descriptions. They exist only in language.
The conceptualist replies: the fact that they exist even just as descriptions demonstrates that they do exist – in the mind. Abstract objects are mental fictions, and as such, they exist.
The Platonist’s retort: how do you explain that we all come up with the same mental fictions? When you and I speak of “the number of apples here,” we’re not talking about two different fictions that each of us came up with and which we happened to give the same name to. We’re speaking about the same thing: the number 2!
The Platonist may add that science corroborates the existence of numbers. Science predicts reality, and it does so through the use of numbers. This verifies the fact that numbers aren’t just some arbitrary or socially conditioned way of interpreting the world.…
In Part 1, we disambiguated between the logic that we intuitively use (hereafter “intuitive logic”) and systems of logic. Systems of logic codify a set of rules of entailment. That set of rules may or may not accurately represent the rules involved in intuitive logic. Logic selection is the process of finding a set of rules that does.
You might think of it this way: there are many systems of geometry. There’s traditional Euclidean geometry, but there are also various non-Euclidean geometries. No one of them is any more a geometry than any other. To choose between these geometries, we need to match up their rules against what happens in the type of space we want them to represent.
So it is with logic. To choose a system of logic, we need to match its rules of entailment against the rules of intuitive logic.
Of course, the process of logic selection cannot be a merely logical one. That would presuppose what we’re looking for. We can (must) use intuitive logic in the selection process, as we use it in all our reasoning. But we can’t use any formal system of logic. So, what do we use?
The selection criteria
Logician Graham Priest presents a theory of logic selection in this video. Priest argues that the process of theory selection is always the same, whether you’re selecting a theory of logic, physics, or economics. The selection criteria are as follows:
Agreement with data
Power (how much data it accounts for)
Relevance (avoidance of the ad-hoc)
Agreement with data is always the most important criterion.…